The history of public health law in the United States has always been about compromise. As noted recently by U.S. Surgeon General Vivek Murthy, the authority to protect and promote communal health is balanced with constitutional or other legal rights of individuals to act or behave as they wish provided they do not harm others. 1 In many cases, the scales are appropriately weighted to respect individual freedoms while advancing the public's health (e.g., public health surveillance activities). In other instances, furtherance of individual rights (e.g., to bear arms) can negatively impact health outcomes across populations. For decades, Americans' religious freedoms under federal and state constitutions (and corresponding statutes and regulations) have been counterbalanced successfully with public health mandates. A prominent example entails the exemption of people from school vaccination requirements in 48 states based on religious freedoms undergirded, but not assured, by the First Amendment and encapsulated in statutory laws. While these exceptions have been challenged legally and politically, most recently following the 2015 measles outbreak, 2 widespread support for limited religious exceptions for vaccines remains. When used sparingly within communities, these vaccination exemptions may have minimal public health impacts.
The public health balancing act concerning religious freedoms, however, may be in the process of recalibration. Since the U.S. Supreme Court disallowed use of the controlled substance peyote as part of religious practices in 1990, 3 multiple versions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) have been passed, first by Congress in 1993 4 and later by 22 states. Fierce debates regarding Indiana's 2015 passage of RFRA centered on potential private-sector sexual orientation discrimination led to an amendment clarifying that the act does not allow such discrimination. 5 The primary objective of RFRAs nationally-respecting individuals' religious beliefs-is laudable. These rights are among the first recognized by the Constitutional Framers and are essential to the fabric of the nation. 6 Yet, continued expansion of religious freedoms runs the risk of shifting trade-offs with essential governmental public health objectives. RFRA applications have the potential to adversely affect public health practices, programs, and objectives depending on (1) who qualifies as a "person" for the purposes of the Act, (2) what it means to exercise one's religion, (3) when and how government may "substantially burden" this exercise, and (4) whether or not government can demonstrate a compelling interest furthering public health objectives through least restrictive means. These issues appear to pertain not only to laws that are challenged, but also to legal modifications to accommodate religious beliefs.
EXPANSION OF RESPECT FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS
Religious freedoms have long been entitled to respect via the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, similar state constitutional provisions, and civil rights laws and policies. However, federal and state passages of RFRAs expand the pool of people who are able to raise claims or seek defenses based on respect for religious freedoms. In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court extended federal RFRA defenses to closely held, forprofit corporations in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 7 Despite vehement dissents among several Justices, the Court held that closely held, for-profit corporations can exercise the religious beliefs of individuals within the company. Indiana's definition of "person" in its version of RFRA specifically includes natural people, churches or other organizations that operate primarily for religious purposes, and anyone controlling or owning a partnership, corporation, company, society, or "any other entity" that "exercises practices that are compelled or limited by a system of religious belief." 8 It seems a "person" in Indiana (and other jurisdictions) for purposes of RFRA is just about anyone or anything that claims to exercise religious beliefs.
Exercising one's religion includes any exercise "whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system or religious belief." 9 This circular concept is exceptionally broad. Exercising religion pursuant to RFRA is literally whatever a religious person says it is. Direct infringements of one's exercise of religion via government are relatively easy for courts to identify. Local or state governments that restrict when, how, or where one can worship are open to RFRA challenges. In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on RFRA to invalidate a federal prohibition under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of the use of hoasca, a hallucinogen found in a sacramental tea used by a religious sect. As Chief Justice Roberts summarized, neither the government's interest in the "war on drugs" nor promotion of public health and safety is sufficient to support its prohibition via RFRA. 10 In another case in Texas in 2009, a federal appellate court dispensed with local ordinances prohibiting the keeping and slaughtering of animals for religious sacrifice on the basis that the ordinances infringed on exercises of religious beliefs in violation of RFRA. 11 Less direct infringements can be more difficult to discern under RFRA and similar First Amendment protections. Given the relative, definitional void of what it means to exercise one's religion, judges are deferential as to the source, nature, and sincerity of expressed religious beliefs. As one court described, "Courts are not permitted to ask whether a particular belief is appropriate or true-however unusual or unfamiliar the belief may be." 12 In Hobby Lobby, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Court were reticent to question the existence or sincerity of the plaintiff corporation's Christian beliefs against the use of specific contraceptives. 7 Doing so runs counter to the legislative intent underlying RFRA that the legitimacy or sincerity of one's religious beliefs is not subject to serious questioning.
DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS
A primary finding of any successful RFRA claim or defense relates to whether or not government substantially burdens a person's exercise of religion. Neither the federal nor Indiana versions of RFRA statutorily define "substantial burden," leaving the matter yet again for courts to decide. In a 1996 New York case, Jolly v. Coughlin, 12 a prisoner suspected of infection with active tuberculosis was quarantined when he refused to submit to testing. The appellate court agreed that quarantine substantially burdened the inmate's Rastafarian beliefs. In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court confirmed that economic costs incurred by a multistate corporation to pay for select reproductive products for its employees pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act constituted a substantial impact on the company's Christian beliefs. 7 Nearly anytime a person can demonstrate a direct physical or economic impact from a governmental policy or program that contravenes the person's religious exercises, a substantial burden may be found pursuant to RFRA. Following Hobby Lobby, many nonprofit religious entities asserted that their beliefs were substantially burdened by the accommodation concerning the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate proposed by the Supreme Court and HHS. 13 In Catholic Benefits Association LCA v. Burwell, 14 an Oklahoma district court held that the beliefs of certain Catholic Benefits Association members were substantially burdened by having to demonstrate that they qualify as an "eligible organization" to receive the accommodation. Other courts, however, have rejected similar arguments. 15 Still, in response, HHS issued an interim final rule allowing religious nonprofits to bypass the contested accommodation procedure and merely notify HHS of the organization's wishes to be accommodated. 16 In 2001, a federal court in Indiana delineated the meaning of "substantial burden" further as "one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central tenet of a person's religious beliefs or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs." 17 Under these tests, even relatively minor infringements of an exercise of religion may be ripe for suit under RFRA. In 1995, Virginia-based abortion opponents challenged the constitutionality of the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act. 18 They posited that their religious opposition to abortion was curtailed by the act's limitations on their ability to physically obstruct access to clinics through peaceful picketing. A federal appellate court agreed that their religious interests were burdened. A year later, protesters argued that FACE burdened their religious mission of counseling women against abortion at Planned Parenthood clinics in Pennsylvania. 19 Such decisions reveal how even tangential impacts on one's exercise of religion may constitute substantial burdens for purposes of RFRA.
COMPELLING PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS
Of course, the mere fact that people's exercise of religion is substantially burdened does not mean they prevail under RFRA. Government can overcome a showing of substantial burden by demonstrating that its law, policy, or program furthers a compelling governmental interest, including protecting or promoting the public's health, by the least restrictive means to the expressed religious interests. This threshold built into Indiana's RFRA and similar acts provides a relative safe harbor for many public health programs and initiatives. Alleging that a specific public health program conflicts with or is contrary to one's religious beliefs is insufficient. Some people, for example, may not like how government expends revenues on public health programs to protect maternal and reproductive health, prevent obesity, curtail tobacco use, screen newborns, or control handguns. Government funding decisions alone do not constitute a RFRA violation so long as they do not impinge on constitutional principles of separation of church and state. RFRA claims or defenses are not the religious equivalent of a conscientious objector clause. 20 Broader-based respect for individuals' religious beliefs, however, can still impact public health objec-tives. In the Jolly case, the court released an inmate at risk of active tuberculosis from his "medical keeplock" because the department of corrections could not justify his continued confinement as serving a compelling interest through the least restrictive means. 12 Expanding the array of objections to school vaccination requirements based on loosely held religious beliefs pursuant to RFRA may further erode herd immunity, leading to increased outbreaks of measles, whooping cough, and other childhood diseases. Enforcement of local licensing or permitting requirements may be questioned to the extent that a business owner's religious principles are implicated. Multiple states, buttressed by court decisions, specifically exempt churches and other religious entities from regulations affecting private-sector child care facilities. 6 In April 2015, a food truck owner in San Antonio, Texas, claimed that local police infringed on her religious freedoms when she was fined for feeding the homeless in a public park without a permit. 21 Law Professor Doug Laycock points to another case in 2013 that struck down a Dallas, Texas, ordinance limiting where charities could feed the homeless based on RFRA despite strong public health and safety concerns underlying the ordinance. 22 Consider the proposed scenario 22 surrounding Indiana's declaration of a public health emergency on March 26, 2015 , in response to a localized human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) outbreak. 23 More than 150 individuals in a rural county have been infected with HIV largely through intravenous drug users addicted to a prescription opioid. 24 Governor Mike Pence's declaration allows for the temporary waiver of drug paraphernalia laws to implement a needle exchange program (NEP). 25 These programs are banned federally, 25 in Indiana, and in multiple other states based on (1) the largely discredited belief that distributing free hypodermic needles furthers illicit drug habits and (2) prior religious or moral objections to distributing needles to sinful, law-breaking injection drug users and their HIV-infected partners. These discredited opinions largely dissipated as NEPs proved efficacious in preventing new cases of HIV. 26 While multiple religious groups now endorse or directly operate these exchanges locally, could a local church whose congregation works to help injection drug users through its addiction center use RFRA to legally contest NEPs in its community? Governor Pence could simply waive this application of RFRA for the duration of the emergency, but this action may be politically unpopular given his strong support for the law. 27 Even if a case proceeded, government can surely argue that operating a NEP in a public health emergency advances a compelling governmental interest. Yet, the New York State Department of Corrections could not support its compelling interest in quarantining prisoners at risk for tuberculosis in Jolly. 12 Furthermore, whether or not operation of a NEP represents the least restrictive means is debatable to the extent that NEPs have been off limits for three decades in Indiana due in part to initial religious objections.
Challenging government's public health efforts to implement isolation and quarantine measures, exchange needles, or require vaccinations as a condition of school attendance based on limited religious objections may seem far-fetched. Yet, RFRA has already been used as both a sword and a shield to thwart or derail existing public health practices and laws. Additional RFRA actions may not contribute significantly to what one legal commentator identified as a trend toward "religious affirmative action program[s]." 6 However, they have the potential to skew the balance of individual and communal rights toward stronger respect for corporate or other religious beliefs in the larger economic marketplace, and away from protection and promotion of the public's health.
